Post by rabiakhatun on Nov 3, 2024 15:40:18 GMT 5.5
I was invited here to moderate a meeting of experts on remote electronic voting (REV) technologies and I happily agreed, since this topic is not new to me - three years ago I was already a member of the working group on electronic voting at the Moscow DIT. Then I had questions about voting from a technical point of view. This time the conversation was about federal voting and I was interested in what had happened in 3 years.
Although it is quite difficult to content writing service compare the Moscow and federal DEG systems - the only thing they have in common is that it is voting and it is built on the basis of blockchain Just kidding.
In any case, I am grateful to the organizers who invited me to the event, where I was able not only to listen, but also to ask questions to those who “ruled” the entire system from within, when in a month and a half, in the fall of 2023, they will once again “embrace” voters.
The event was held in the cryptography museum and this predetermined the topic of the first session, devoted entirely to the issues of cryptography, which allows to protect the integrity, non-repudiation and confidentiality of the expression of will. When I was preparing for the event, this was one of the problems that I wanted to voice. We understand that pure cryptography is not able to solve all the problems of information security. And, at a minimum, it is necessary to evaluate the correctness of the implementation of cryptography, as well as its application in a specific system. In the end, the DEG is a multitude of components, among which the cryptographic information protection tool is only a small part. But this fear was dispelled within the framework of the first technical presentation - colleagues from Rostelecom, who are the developers and operators of the DEG, assured me that at the next session the conversation will be about other aspects related to the security of the DEG. In particular, about putting the system on one of the Bug Bounty platforms.
Although it is quite difficult to content writing service compare the Moscow and federal DEG systems - the only thing they have in common is that it is voting and it is built on the basis of blockchain Just kidding.
In any case, I am grateful to the organizers who invited me to the event, where I was able not only to listen, but also to ask questions to those who “ruled” the entire system from within, when in a month and a half, in the fall of 2023, they will once again “embrace” voters.
The event was held in the cryptography museum and this predetermined the topic of the first session, devoted entirely to the issues of cryptography, which allows to protect the integrity, non-repudiation and confidentiality of the expression of will. When I was preparing for the event, this was one of the problems that I wanted to voice. We understand that pure cryptography is not able to solve all the problems of information security. And, at a minimum, it is necessary to evaluate the correctness of the implementation of cryptography, as well as its application in a specific system. In the end, the DEG is a multitude of components, among which the cryptographic information protection tool is only a small part. But this fear was dispelled within the framework of the first technical presentation - colleagues from Rostelecom, who are the developers and operators of the DEG, assured me that at the next session the conversation will be about other aspects related to the security of the DEG. In particular, about putting the system on one of the Bug Bounty platforms.